

involves” (p. 194). That said, readers who are not familiar with Lebanese history, politics, and society may find it difficult to follow all of the events and the actors mentioned in the book; perhaps a more general introductory chapter (or a glossary) would have been helpful to them.

Although the book certainly adds to our understanding of Lebanon, some of its claims are unconvincing. First, the role of the state in Lebanon (and elsewhere in the region), is by no means “marginal,” including in the realm of “memorialisation” (p. 6, n. 1). In fact, some of the state-sponsored narratives of the war, such as the claim that it was, essentially, a “war of others” (i.e., of foreign actors, both state and non-state) have had an impact on in its civil society. Second, and in the same vein, the threat posed to the state itself (and not merely to its political leaders) by “mentioning” the war, which induced the policy of state-sponsored silence, is not explained. Third, the book does not mention that some Lebanese factions invited these external forces (both state and non-state) to intervene in the conflict, leading to its “internationalization,” and that the claim regarding a “war of others” in Lebanon is, hence, an attempt to silence this role. Finally, the book does not emphasize enough that the discourse regarding the conflict was very political indeed: it was a way of criticizing the political, social, and economic order in postwar Lebanon, including Syria’s hegemonic role there, in an indirect manner.

Finally, the book contains several factual errors. First, the civil war ended on October 13, 1990, and not in November 1990 (p. 15). Second, Bechara al-Khuri was President of Lebanon in the period 1943–1952 and Camille Chamoun was President in 1952–1958, and not as stated (p. 40). Third, the presidential terms of Frangieh, Chehab, and Helou are stated

incorrectly (p. 165). Fourth, Amal did not exist in 1958 (p. 165). Fifth, it was the leader of the Lebanese Forces, and not a “breakaway fraction” (p. 18) of it, who signed the Tripartite Agreement in 1985. Finally, and contrary to the book’s claim (p. 57), the Lebanese Parliament was actually quite active during the war: its members met and elected five (!) presidents, debated and approved important laws, and ratified and annulled agreements and treaties (including the May 17, 1983 agreement with Israel, which, incidentally, was *not* a peace agreement; cf. p. 207, n. 23).

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SAUDI ARABIA

Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979, by Thomas Hegghammer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 238 pages. Appends. to p. 249. Bibl. to p. 276. Index to p. 290. \$99 cloth; \$29.99 paper.

Reviewed by Joseph A. Kéchichian

Intelligence personnel everywhere have grappled and continue to struggle with one of the most enigmatic searches in contemporary affairs — profiling “terrorists” — that would, presumably, help identify and, hopefully, prevent contemplated violent actions. For most, Saudi Arabia remains the heartland of radical “Islamism,” a boom for security agencies anxious to figure what is beyond their reach. Nearly a decade after 9/11, few have figured out how to predict with any reasonable accuracy why a young Saudi becomes a militant. Thomas Hegghammer, a Senior Fellow at the Norwegian Defense Research Estab-

lishment (*Forsvarets forskningsinstitut*, FFI), makes a significant contribution in this useful book, relying primarily on Islamist sources. As such, the unclassified study highlights post-1979 Saudi jihadism, and offers a variety of explanations for its rise and fall. It is jam-packed with names and events, based on a database that “contains 539 unique biographies of Saudi militants active between 1980 and 2006,” and which will stand as a reference guide (pp. 13, 239).

Hegghammer’s “Introduction” presents a very ambitious theoretical framework that aims to decipher the Jihadi iceberg by focusing on its hidden parts. His primary assertion is that the “movement in Saudi Arabia differs from its counterparts in the Arab republics in being driven primarily by extreme pan-Islamism and not socio-revolutionary ideology” (p. 1). He painstakingly demonstrates how the conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Bosnia, and elsewhere — that raged with a vengeance throughout 1980s and early 1990s — motivated hundreds of young Saudis to sacrifice themselves in defense of Islam (pp. 38–58). Importantly, most Afghan-bound holy warriors were not propelled by anti-Americanism, reveals Hegghammer. Rather, clever recruiters tricked them into service by promising glory as they liberated occupied Muslim lands (pp. 133–138).

Hegghammer further avows that commonly used theological descriptions “in the literature on Islamism, such as *salafi*, *wahabi*, *jihadi salafi*, and *takfiri*, do not correspond to discrete and observable patterns of political behaviour among Islamist” (p. 5). His preferences are for three new terms, namely “socio-revolutionary Islamism,” “classical jihadism,” and “global jihadism” (p. 7). These classifications are geared to buttress Hegghammer’s hypothesis, namely that Saudi pan-Islamism is “a macro-

nationalism, centred on the imagined community of the *umma* (global community of Muslims)” (p. 8), which must be a, if not the, primary explanation for the short-lived outburst of violence in Saudi Arabia between 2000 and 2006.

Still, Hegghammer is highly critical of successive Saudi governments, ostensibly because Riyadh oscillated between soft and harsh policing methods that bordered on schizophrenia. His belief that Saudis failed to understand how to handle pan-Islamism is telling. Presumably, after the oil boom of the 1970s, Saudi leaders expressed sympathy with the suffering of other Muslims, and encouraged their subjects to dole out large sums of cash to provide sorely needed assistance. Ironically, this was meant to buttress Saudi legitimacy and, allegedly, was a wonderful model as long as the burgeoning jihadists operated outside of the Kingdom. When jihadists went after expatriate workers inside the Kingdom, Saudi security forces mobilized, tracking down and killing leading militants. Naturally, when dissidents were tortured, this further radicalized survivors as the actions and reactions swirled into a pattern.

One could argue the points that the fate that befell Muslims around the world — the unfolding events after 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and then Iraq, and the open-ended variety against “terror” — all stimulated whatever disenchantment existed among radical elements. Nevertheless, against a rising level of violence, complacent and poorly-trained authorities were pointed at with indignation after they embarked on massive manhunts in 2003 when Saudi jihadi violence burst out in the streets of Riyadh. At the time, a residential compound was targeted where 35 individuals were killed and, over a short period of time, a series of suicide bombings claimed more than 300 additional

lives. Hegghammer provides most of the unclassified details in his elaborate narrative, and even traces the rise of Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (QAP), which claimed responsibility for these attacks. While the author is critical of Saudi security forces, whose officers were caught by surprise, he acknowledges that Islamists quickly lost public support as their actions on Saudi soil frightened traditional supporters. It was not long before Riyadh rounded up surviving jihadists.

Readers will appreciate the author's due diligence in writing this book and forgive the heavy reliance on anonymous sources. They will also have to overlook sentences like: "the instrumentalist interpretation of global jihadism is reductive, because it ignores the crucial role of discursive frames in mobilisation processes" (p. 103), or "QAP writers used terms such as *kah'in al-haramayn* (Traitor of the Two Holy Mosques) instead of *khadim al-haramayn* (Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques) and *hay'at kibar al-umala* (Council of Senior Agents) instead of *hay'at kibar al-ulama* (Council of Senior Scholars)" (p. 200), as scholarly aberrations. One might even wish to ignore "Populist pan-Islamism, was thus to some extent Saudi Arabia's 'opium for the people'" (p. 23), as an equally superficial claim.

In the end, one of the main reasons why QAP and Saudi jihadists failed was probably due to their minuscule numbers (around 1,000), which is hardly sufficient to mobilize and lead Arabia. QAP's writ was etched in blood and proved to be disastrously counterproductive simply because few Saudis expected to define happiness via murder and mayhem. That is also why the Al Sa'ud — despite all of their shortcomings — remained resilient. Their rule was not only legitimized through the application of scriptures and fear (certainly, one of the most effective instruments at the disposal of nation-

states), but also because they recognized that ordinary people were entitled to, and capable of, happiness. In Hegghammer's own words: "what is perhaps even more remarkable is the fact that [violent mobilization in Saudi Arabia] was not accompanied by a massive overreaction by the state" (p. 236) even if Riyadh adopted effective methods to counter challenges. Hegghammer is sympathetic to such nuances, which is why Saudi jihadists fell so miserably. All they could offer was death.

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Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia, by Steffen Hertog. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2010. xii + 275 pages. Refs. to p. 288. Index to p. 297. \$35.

Reviewed by David E. Long

This book addresses the Saudi state's evolution from a poor, isolated tribal principality in the world into one of the world's most important and wealthiest oil states, all to a great extent within living memory. It is a phenomenon that has often been discussed and has been witnessed by many expatriate Western technocrats and businessmen, but seldom has been addressed accurately or in depth.

Following an introductory chapter, the book is divided into two parts: "Oil and History," which is about the evolution of the oil state following World War II up to the 1973 Arab oil embargo that created unprecedented wealth, both in the public and private economic sectors; and "Policy-Making in Segmented Clientelism," which addresses the impact oil-financed modernization on government decision-making and bureaucracy, and how that affected Saudi

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