

**POLISCI 218T – Terrorism**  
**Stanford University, Spring Quarter 2013**  
Syllabus v. 1.1 (new dates)

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Hours: Tuesdays 1.00 - 3.00 pm

Thursdays 2.15 - 5.00 pm  
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**Course description**

In this seminar we examine the peculiar form of political violence known as terrorism and the groups that specialize in it.

The course has four main objectives:

1. Introduce students to the history of terrorism and the landscape of terrorist groups
2. Familiarize students with the main themes and debates in the academic literature on terrorism
3. Sensitize students to the methodological challenges involved in the study of terrorism
4. Equip students with perspectives and tools to better understand the behavior of terrorist groups

The course takes an actor-centered approach to the study of terrorism and is designed with two overarching questions in mind: why do individuals and groups resort to terrorism when other means are available, and why do they do so in different ways? We will examine cutting-edge research on terrorist group behavior, asking questions such as: How do terrorist groups emerge? Which organizational challenges do they face, and how do they typically solve them? Under which circumstances do groups decline? Why do some rebels use terrorism as one of several strategies, while others specialize in it? Why do some terrorists “go global” while others stay local? Why do only some groups use suicide attacks? As we explore these analytical questions, we will also acquire in-depth historical knowledge of a range of groups, from 19<sup>th</sup> century Anarchists to al-Qaida today.

The seminar is intended primarily for juniors and seniors in political science with an interest in international security. However, there are no formal prerequisites for the course, and students from other disciplines are very welcome. The seminar will be limited to 20 students; in case of oversubscription, priority will be given to seniors.

The syllabus is structured in three parts. The first part (weeks 1-3) serves as an introduction and examines the definitional debate, trends and junctures in the history of terrorism, and the ideologies espoused by terrorist groups. In the second and main part (weeks 4-9), we explore analytical themes pertaining to the organizing of violence, each of which corresponds to a key stage or bottleneck in the lifecycle of a terrorist group: formation, recruitment, organization, tactics, and decline. In the last session (week 10) we look in depth at al-Qaida. There may be minor changes to the syllabus along the way, but these will be communicated in class and on CourseWork.

Seminars will be interactive. There will be no formal lecturing (and no handouts), but I will present primary source material, including videos, to supplement the readings and the discussion.

## Requirements

**1. Prepare and participate.** Students are required to attend all class meetings, read all the assigned literature before each session, and participate actively in the discussion. This course is reading-intensive (100-200 pages per week) and thus requires a daily reading routine. Students are also encouraged to read major newspapers daily and keep an eye out for terrorism-related news, as these may be discussed in class.

**2. Write response papers.** Starting in week 2, students are expected to produce a short response paper every week, to be submitted in class at the start of each seminar. A response paper is a short set of informally written reflections on some or all of the readings for that week. It should be between a quarter and half a page long and consist of at least five points or questions reflecting critical engagement with the readings. Response papers are used to structure the class discussion; they are not graded, but repeated failure to produce them on time will negatively affect a student's class participation grade.

**3. Learn a case and present it.** Students will be asked to form teams of two or three who will work together to become class experts on a terrorist group of their choice. Each team will collect information on their group throughout the course. Your expertise will be used for three things:

- a) *The final exam.* The take-home exam will have some questions that presuppose in-depth knowledge of one case.
- b) *Enrichment of class discussion.* Students are expected to contribute relevant examples and insights from their specialization to all discussions throughout the course.
- c) *A presentation.* Each team will give one 10-minute presentation some time during weeks 4-9 in which they explore one of the five aforementioned analytical themes (formation, recruitment, organization, tactics, or decline) with data from their case. The presentation will be graded. Assignment of teams and presentation dates will be done in week 2. Students are free to choose any relevant group from any time period, provided it is reasonably well documented (many groups are not). Here are some examples of relatively well-studied groups:

Action Directe	Hamas
Anarchists (19 <sup>th</sup> century)	IRA
Al-Qaida (pre-2001)	Ku Klux Klan (50s and 60s)
Aum Shinrikyo	PKK
Black September Group	Rote Armé Fraktion
ETA	Sendero Luminoso
Front de Libération du Quebec	Weather Underground

Students are expected to locate relevant sources themselves. In addition to reading the main secondary sources, students should familiarize themselves with the key primary sources on their group (memoirs, major statements, etc). Those with foreign language skills should consider choosing a case that allows them to use these skills. For practical reasons I cannot offer specific bibliographic advice beyond the mini research guide provided below.

**4. Complete a take-home exam.** There will be a final take-home exam with a 24-hour deadline. The exam will be posted on CourseWork at noon on Monday 10 June and answers

should be submitted by noon on Tuesday 11 June. Answers can be either uploaded to CourseWork or submitted in paper copy at the front desk of the Political Science Department .

Being subject to the provisions of the Honor Code means in part that you must observe the rules established for this exam, which are: *you may consult only inanimate sources. You may not consult or collaborate with anyone about the questions.* Such collaboration is a violation of the Honor Code, which states that students “will not give or receive aid in examinations, that they will not give or receive unpermitted aid in class work, in the preparation of reports, or in any other work that is to be used by the instructor as the basis of grading; and that they will do their share and take an active part in seeing to it that others as well as themselves uphold the spirit and letter of the Honor Code.” Violations of the Honor Code include: copying from another’s exam or paper or allowing someone else to copy from one’s own paper or exam; unpermitted collaboration; plagiarism (which includes careless or sloppy use of citations); revising or resubmitting an assignment for re-grading without the instructor’s knowledge and consent; giving or receiving unpermitted aid on a take-home examination; representing one’s own work as the work of another; giving or receiving aid on an academic assignment under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known that such aid was not permitted. For more information about the Honor Code, see <http://studentaffairs.stanford.edu/judicialaffairs/policy/honor-code>

Final grades will be based on class participation (20%), the presentation (20%) and the exam (60%). I do not grade on a curve, which means that in theory, everyone can get the same grade. Penalties for late submission of the take-home exam are as follows: 0-6 hours: one letter grade; 6-12 hours: two letter grades; 12+ hours: submission not accepted. Exam postponement or extensions will be granted at the instructor’s discretion in exceptional and legitimate circumstances, such as medical emergencies affecting the student or his/her close family.

### **Etiquette**

Students are requested not to use their laptops, cell phones, or tablets during class for any reason. Drinks and dry food, on the other hand, are allowed.

I do my best to respond to email from students, but I cannot guarantee a reply in the first 48 hours. Please help minimize email traffic by not requesting information that can easily be obtained elsewhere; for example, from your classmates or on Google. Moreover, substantive questions are best left for office hour meetings. Please make office hour appointments at <http://hegghammer.youcanbook.me/> - not by email.

### **Students with Documented Disabilities**

Students who may need an academic accommodation based on the impact of a disability must initiate the request with the Office of Accessible Education (OAE). Professional staff will evaluate the request with required documentation, recommend reasonable accommodations, and prepare an Accommodation Letter for faculty dated in the current quarter in which the request is being made. Students should contact the OAE as soon as possible since timely notice is needed to coordinate accommodations. The OAE is located at 563 Salvatierra Walk (phone: 723-1066, URL: <http://studentaffairs.stanford.edu/oae>).

## A mini-guide to qualitative terrorism data collection

Secondary sources:

NB: Use *Wikipedia* with extreme caution. Use it if you must for basic queries, but *never* rely on it for academic purposes.

- Search for books and articles in the big databases, such as *WorldCat*, *Google Scholar*, *JSTOR*, *Web of Science*, and *EBSCO Host*. Note that the Stanford Library has *xSearch*, which will search multiple databases simultaneously
- Browse and search specialist journals such as *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *CTC Sentinel*, *Jamestown Terrorism Monitor*
- Search for theses and dissertations on *Proquest*.
- Search for news articles on *Lexis-Nexis* (English-language media) and *World News Connection* (non-English media).
- Browse and search specialist magazines, blogs and websites, such as  
<http://www.longwarjournal.org>  
<http://intelwire.egoplex.com/documents.html>  
<http://www.ict.org.il/>  
<http://www.teachingterror.net/>  
<http://www.splcenter.org/>
- Consult other research guides  
Google “terrorism research guide”  
Browse syllabi collections (e.g., <http://www.teachingterror.net/syllabi.htm>)  
Check annotated bibliographies (e.g., <http://www.teachingterror.com/bibliography/>)

Primary sources:

- Check the footnotes of the best secondary sources
- Search for memoirs on *WorldCat* (also try Amazon, for the related books feature)
- Search for interviews on *Lexis-Nexis* and *Google*
- Look for court transcripts (either directly from <http://www.pacer.gov/> or from online repositories such as <http://www.investigativeproject.org/research.php>)
- Look for declassified documents, for example at the Digital National Security Archive (<http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do>) and the HARMONY documents at the Combating Terrorism Center (<http://www.ctc.usma.edu/>)
- Check radical website monitoring sites such as *Jihadology*, *MEMRI*, or *SITE* (the latter is subscription-only)
- Search for propaganda videos and documentaries on *Youtube* and *Dailymotion*
- Browse radical websites directly (for example *Stormfront*, *Revleft*, and *Ansar al-Mujahidin*)
- Use *Waybackmachine* to retrieve defunct websites (<http://archive.org/index.php>)

## Course schedule and reading assignments

All the readings will be available as PDF documents on CourseWork. I recommend going through them in the order listed below.

### 1. Definitions and data (4 April)

- a) Hoffman, Bruce (2006). "Defining Terrorism" (Chapter 1). In *Inside Terrorism* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed). New York: Columbia University Press, 1-41.
- b) Tilly, Charles (2004). "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists." *Sociological Theory* 22(1): 5-13.
- c) Merari, Ariel (1993). "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5(4): 213-251.
- d) Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio, and Luis de la Calle (2009). "Domestic Terrorism: The hidden side of Political Violence." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 31-49.
- e) Findley, Michael G., and Joseph K. Young (2012). "Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a Conceptual Problem." *Perspectives on Politics* 10(2): 285-305.
- f) Dahl, Erik (2011). "The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks Against the United States." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 34(8): 621-648.

### 2. Historical trends (11 April)

- a) Rapoport, David (1984): "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions", *American Political Science Review* 78(3): 658-677.
- b) Jensen, Richard B. (2004). "Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16(1): 116-153.
- c) Shughart, William F. (2006). "An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945-2000." *Public Choice* 128(1-2): 7-39.
- d) Hoffman, Bruce (2006). "The Internationalization of Terrorism" (Chapter 3). In *Inside Terrorism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 63-80.
- e) Tucker, David (2001). "What's New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13(3): 1-14.

### 3. Ideologies (18 April)

- a) Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio (2007). "The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 19(3): 289-206.

- b) Pluchinsky, Dennis A. (1992). "Western Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations" (Chapter 2). In Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky, *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*. London, Frank Cass, 16-54.
- c) Sprinzak, Ehud (1995). "Right-wing terrorism in a comparative perspective: The case of split delegitimization." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7(1): 17-43.
- d) Lutz, James, and Brenda Lutz (2004). "Religious Justifications for Terrorism" (Chapter 5). In *Global Terrorism*. London: Routledge, 63-88.
- e) Munson, Henry (2003). "Islam, Nationalism and Resentment of Foreign Domination." *Middle East Policy* 10(2): 40-53.
- f) Brooke, Steven (2008). "Jihadi Strategic Debates Before 9/11." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31(3): 201-226.

#### **4. Group formation and campaign onset (25 April)**

- a) Crenshaw, Martha (1998). "The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice." (Chapter 1). In Walter Reich, Ed. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), 7-24.
- b) Kydd, Andrew and Barbara Walter (2006). "The Strategies of Terrorism." *International Security* 31(1): 49-80.
- c) Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, and Arie Perliger (2009). "When political parties turn to terrorism" (Chapter 3). In *Political Parties and Terrorism* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). London: Routledge, 41-74.
- d) McCormick, Gordon H. (2003). "Terrorist Decision Making." *Annual Review of Political Science* 6: 473-507.
- e) Della Porta, Donatella (1995). "Organizational processes and violence in social movements" (Chapter 4). In *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 83-112.
- f) Baumel, Judith Tydor (2001). "Kahane in America: An Exercise in Right-Wing Urban Terror." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 22(4):311-329.

#### **5. Joining and recruiting (2 May)**

- a) Russell, Charles , and Bowman Miller (1977). "Profile of a Terrorist," *Terrorism* 1(1): 17-34.
- b) Lee, Alexander (2011). "Who Becomes a Terrorist? Poverty, Education, and the Origins of Political Violence." *World Politics* 63(2): 203-245.

- c) Victoroff, Jeff (2005). "The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(1): 3-42.
- d) Della Porta, Donatella (1988). "Recruitment processes in clandestine political organizations: Italian left-wing terrorism." *International Social Movements Research* 1: 155-169.
- e) Nesser, Petter (2006). "Profiles of Jihadist Terrorists in Europe." In Cheryl Benard, Ed., *A Future for the Young, Options for Helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization*. Washington DC: RAND, 31-49.
- f) Hegghammer, Thomas (2013). "The Recruiter's Dilemma: Signaling and Terrorist Recruitment Tactics." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(1): 3-16.

## 6. Organization and control (9 May)

- a) Zelinsky, Aaron, and Martin Shubik (2009). "Research Note: Terrorist Groups as Business Firms: A New Typological Framework." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21(2): 327-336.
- b) Shapiro, Jacob N. (2005). *Organizing Terror: Hierarchy and Networks in Covert Organizations*. Working paper.
- c) Shapiro, Jacob (2008). "Bureaucratic Terrorists: Al-Qa'ida in Iraq's Management of Finances" (Chapter 3). In Fishman, Brian, Ed., *Bombers, Bank Accounts and Bleedout: Al-Qa'ida's Road In and Out of Iraq*. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 66-80.
- d) Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeld (1999). "The Advent of Netwar: Analytic Background." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 22(3): 193-206.
- e) Joosse, Paul (2007). "Leaderless Resistance and Ideological Inclusion: The Case of the Earth Liberation Front." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19(3): 351-368.
- f) Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones (2008). "Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May be Less Threatening Than We Think." *International Security* 33(2): 7-44.

## 7. Targeting and lethality (16 May)

(Look again at Sanchez-Cuenca & de la Calle from week 1)

- a) Drake, C. J. M. (1998). "The role of ideology in terrorist target selection." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10(2): 53-85.
- b) Juergensmeyer, Marc (2003). *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press, 119-160.

- c) Piazza, James A. (2009). "Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous? An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure", *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21(1): 62-88.
- d) Asal, Victor, and R. Karl Rethemeyer (2008). "The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks", *Journal of Politics* 70(2): 437-449.
- e) Jackson, Brian and David Frelinger (2008). "Rifling Through the Terrorists' Arsenal: Exploring Groups' Weapon Choices and Technology Strategies." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31(7): 583-604.
- f) Bale, Jeffrey M., and Gary Ackerman (2009). "Profiling the WMD Terrorism Threat" (Chapter 2). In Stephen M. Maurer, Ed., *WMD Terrorism: Science and Policy Choices*. Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 11-46.

### **8. Suicide terrorism (23 May)**

- a) Merari, Ariel (2010). "A Controlled Study of Would-Be Suicides" (Chapter 5). In *Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 103-146.
- b) Pape, Robert (2003). "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *American Political Science Review* 97(3): 343-361.
- c) Moghadam, Assaf (2008/2009). "Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks." *International Security* 33(3): 46-78.
- d) Michael C. Horowitz (2010). "Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism," *International Organization* 64(1): 33-64.
- e) Thayer, Bradley A., and Valerie Hudson (2010). "Sex and the Shaheed: Insights from the Life Sciences on Islamic Suicide Terrorism." *International Security* 34(4): 37-62.

### **9. Campaign closure and disengagement (30 May)**

- a) Cronin, Audrey K. (2006), "How Al Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *International Security* 31(1): 7-48.
- b) Abrahms, Max (2006). "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." *International Security* 31(2): 42-78.
- c) Horgan, John (2008). "Deradicalization or Disengagement? A Process in Need of Clarity and a Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2(4).

- d) Moghadam, Assaf (2012). "Failure and Disengagement in the Red Army Faction." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 35(2): 156-181.
- e) Rubin, Elizabeth (2004). "The Jihadi Who Kept Asking Why." *New York Times*, 7 March.

## 10. Al-Qaida (6 June)

(Look again at Steven Brooke's article from week 3.)

- a) Hegghammer, Thomas (2011). "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad." *International Security* 35(3): 53-94.
- b) *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004). New York: W. W. Norton, 47-70; 145-173; 215-253.
- c) Lawrence, Bruce (2005). *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*. London: Verso, 23-30; 58-62; 237-244.
- d) Bergen, Peter, and Paul Cruickshank (2007). "The Iraq Effect: The War in Iraq and its Impact on the War on Terrorism." *Mother Jones Magazine*, 1 March.
- e) Bergen, Peter, Bruce Hoffman and Katherine Tiedemann (2011). "Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to America and American Interests." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 34(2): 65-101.
- f) Risa Brooks (2011), "Muslim 'Homegrown Terrorism' in the United States." *International Security* 36(2): 7-47.
- g) Philip Mudd (2013). "Algeria Attack Represents al Qaeda's Dying Gasp." *The Daily Beast*, 24 January.
- h) Bruce Riedel (2013). "New Al-Qaeda Generation May Be Deadliest One." *Al-Monitor*, 24 January.